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The Dutch economy has received a great deal of acclaim
recently. Indeed, recent attention for the Netherlands is due
to not only its EU presidency but also its good economic
performance, especially as far as employment is con-
cerned. Twenty years ago, economists were discussing the
Dutch disease. Now, they talk about the Dutch miracle.
This article addresses the following three questions.
What is behind the ‘wonderful’ healing of the Dutch
economy? To what extent has the Dutch patient really
recovered at the moment and what is the unfinished
agenda facing Dutch policymakers? What can the other EU
countries learn from the Dutch? Before turning to these
questions, we examine some aggregate data.
Labor-market developments
Employment
Employment (in persons) in the Netherlands grew at an
annual rate of about 1.4% a year between 1983 and 1995.
The corresponding figure for the EU-15 countries was only
0.4% (see Figure 1). If we express employment in terms of
hours, the picture does not change fundamentally; in terms
of employment growth, the Netherlands has been outper-
forming the rest of Europe by a considerable margin dur-
ing the last 15 years (see Figure 2).
This employment growth reflects rapid growth of labor
supply during this period. Two main factors boosted Dutch
labor supply: relatively rapid population growth and a
gradual catching up of the low female labor-force partici-
pation rate to the European average (see Figure 3).
* (tel. 31-70-3383400; e-mail: alb@cpb.nl)
Figure 1  Employment in persons
Source: Wildcat, CPB
* tel: 31-70-3383400; e-mail: alb@cpb.nl
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Figure 2  Growth of total hours actually
worked, 1984-1994
Source: Maddison, 1991, 1995; Pilat, 1996; DIW; CPB
* (tel. 31-70-3383400; e-mail: alb@cpb.nl)
Figure 3  Gross participation rate, 1975-1995
Source: Wildcat, CPB
Abstract
After documenting rapid Dutch employment growth in
recent years, this article explores the main reasons
behind recent strong employment growth in the
Netherlands. Subsequently, it discusses the unfinished
agenda facing Dutch policymakers. Finally, the lessons
for other countries of the recent Dutch experience are
summarized.
Samenvatting
Na cijfers over de recente sterke werkgelegenheidsgroei
in Nederland gepresenteerd te hebben, bespreekt dit
artikel de belangrijkste verklarende factoren voor deze
groei. Daarna komen de nog aan te  pakken zwakke
punten van de Nederlandse economie aan de orde.
Tenslotte worden de lessen voor andere landen van de
Nederlandse ervaringen samengevat.
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Despite the rapid expansion of labor supply, unemploy-
ment (measured in an internationally comparable manner,
namely as the number of persons who are actively looking
for work and are available to start work within two weeks)
fell substantially. Figure 4 illustrates the turn-around in the
Dutch relative performance in the EU. In 1983, the Dutch
unemployment rate of 12 percent exceeded the correspon-
ding rate in the other EU countries by more than 2 percent-
age points. In 1996, in contrast, the Dutch rate of 6.5 percent
was 4 percentage points lower. The EU unemployment rate
in 1996 was higher than in 1983. The Dutch unemployment
rate, in contrast, was almost cut in half between 1983 and
1996 and is now close to the corresponding rate in the
United States.
Labor costs
Rapid employment growth in the Netherlands was facili-
tated by wage moderation. Whereas unit labor costs in
Dutch manufacturing remained roughly constant during
the last fifteen years, unit labor costs in Germany, which
featured about the same inflation rate as the Netherlands
during this period, rose on average by about 2 1/2 percent
per year (see Figure 5).
Wage moderation boosted employment through three
main channels. First, it restored profitability of businesses,
thereby creating the room and the incentive to boost invest-
ment (see Figure 6). The share of labor income in net enter-
prise income declined from 95% in 1981 to around 83% in
recent years. Second, it improved the competitive position
on world markets (see Figure 7), thereby raising net exports.
Third, it rendered growth more labor intensive. Indeed, the
growth of labor productivity per hour worked lagged that
in other European countries.2 Due to the increase in employ-
ment in hours, however, growth of GDP per capita ex-
ceeded that in other member states of the EU (see Table 1).
In terms of GDP per head (purchasing power parities), the
Netherlands ranks now 7th in the EU, while it had declined
to the 11th position by 1988 (see Figure 8).
The recent Dutch experience provides evidence for the
effectiveness of wage moderation in stimulating employ-
ment. Table 2 reveals that during the periods 1973-1982 and
1983-1996, growth of relevant world demand was similar.
Dutch employment performance, however, was substan-
tially better over the latter period. The main explanatory
factor behind the improved performance of employment
during 1983-1996 is wage moderation.
Factors behind recent employment growth
A deep crisis
In the beginning of the eighties, the Dutch economy was in
dire straights: the fiscal deficit had widened to record lev-
els, about two thirds of GDP was spent or redistributed by
the government, taxation and social security contributions
accounted for about half of GDP (see Figure 9), business
profitability and investment had plummeted dramatically,
* (tel. 31-70-3383400; e-mail: alb@cpb.nl)
Figure 4  Unemployment rate, 1975-1995
Source: Wildcat, CPB
* (tel. 31-70-3383400; e-mail: alb@cpb.nl)
Figure 5  Unit labor costs, manufacturing
Source: Wildcat, CPB
and for every ten employed persons there were about eight
persons on social benefits (see Figure 10). Moreover, GDP
per head grew much slower than in other EU countries (see
Figure 8).
In order to understand the origins of this crisis, we
should go back to the sixties, when the welfare state ex-
panded substantially and rapid wage growth eroded prof-
itability. Subsequently, the Netherlands, like all OECD coun-
tries, was hit by stagflation as a result of the abrupt




GDP per capita 1.85 2.02
GDP per hours worked 3.77 2.60
Hours per worker –1.79 –1.06
Employment/population –0.06 0.60
Sources: CPB: Wildcat (release CEP97), except hours per worker: Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
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increases in oil prices in the early seventies. Initially, the
Dutch government attempted to address the economic
downturn through expansionary policies and employment
creation in the public sector. The rapid expansion of the
public sector was financed by higher revenues from natu-
ral gas, higher taxes and premiums, and a widening fiscal
deficit (see Figure 9). At the same time, generous benefits
in combination with lax administrative controls allowed
employers and unions to put low productive, redundant
workers in social security schemes with open-ended
benefits, such as the disability scheme (see Figure 10).
Hence, the stagnation and subsequent decline in private-
sector employment did not produce a rapid rise in open
unemployment.
When the second oil crisis hit at the end of the seventies,
Dutch policymakers had lost all room for expansionary




Relevant world tradea 4.7 5.3
Employment
- hours –1.6 0.9
- persons –0.8 1.4
Production 1.9 3.0
Real labor costs 3.8 0.8
annual absolute changes in level (x 1000)
Employment growth
- labor years –33 50
- persons –31 55
Labor share in value added (%) 1.2 –0.8
aWorld imports, excluding energy, reweighted to geographical distribution
and product-mix of Dutch exports.
Source: CPB: Wildcat (release CEP97).
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Figure  9  Public finances, 1970-1998a
a1997 and 1988 are estimates
Source: CPB
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Figure 7  Unit labor costs, relative to
competitors
Source: Wildcat, CPB
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Figure 6  Labor income share, manufacturing
Source: Wildcat, CPB
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Figure  8  Dutch GDP per capita
(purchasing power parities) in terms of
GDP per capita in the EU, 1970-1998a
a1996-1998 are CPB estimates
Source:OECD, National Accounts, main aggregates, vol. I, 1997 edition.
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policies: the fiscal deficit was approaching 10% of GDP,
resulting in an explosion of the public debt to GDP ratio. At
that time, the Dutch economy was caught in a vicious circle
of less employment and more claims on the welfare state.
By raising the cost of labor, higher premiums depressed
employment further. With the welfare state acting as a ‘so-
cial hammock’, the adverse macroeconomic shocks of the
seventies threatened the viability of the system.
In the beginning of the eighties, when unemployment
was exploding, the need for drastic measures became
increasingly apparent. In taking these measures (see be-
low), the first Lubbers administration, which came to power
in 1982, did not bargain with the social partners, i.e. the
unions and employers. Indeed, the character of the
relationship between the government and social partners
changed from bargaining over mutual concessions, such
as trading tax reductions for wage moderation, to the
development of common policy orientations, such as a
strong employment performance. In this way, respon-
sibilities of government and social partners were better
delineated.
Social partners concluded a number of successful bilat-
eral agreements in the eighties and nineties with non-bind-
ing qualitative recommendations on specific issues. These
agreements contrast with the failed attempts to arrive at
detailed ‘social accords’ of the seventies. While the central
organizations issue broad guidelines and agreements,
these guidelines are actually implemented on a more de-
centralized, sectoral level. Actual wage negotiations, for
example, are taking place at a sectoral level. This mix of
centralized and decentralized negotiations has served the
Netherlands quite well over the past fifteen years.
Wage moderation was facilitated by an agreement be-
tween social partners in 1982. Initially, the main factor be-
hind wage moderation was the weak bargaining position
of organized workers due to rapidly rising unemployment.
Later on, the positive results of wage moderation streng-
thened confidence in the revised consultation economy.
Hence, compared to other EU countries, the Netherlands
started the reform process earlier because it was con-
fronted with a deep crisis at a relatively early stage.
Fiscal policy
The government initially supported wage moderation by
spending cuts, which resulted in lower replacement rates
for social benefits. Among other things, the government
broke the link of wages in the public sector and social ben-
efits to wages in the private sector. Hence, rather than pas-
sively following wages in the private sector, the govern-
ment actively set a trend in wages in the public sector and
social benefits, thereby affecting private wages. Statutory
social benefits were cut from 80% to 70% of gross wages.
In addition, the minimum wage, to which the minimum
social benefits are linked, was frozen in nominal terms in
a number of years. This reduced the after-tax minimum
Figure  12  Average tax wedge, 1979-1998a
a1997 and 1998 are estimates
Source: CPB
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Figure  11   Minimum wage
Source: CPB







After-tax minimum wage to after-tax modal wage
* (tel. 31-70-3383400; e-mail: alb@cpb.nl)
Figure  10  Number of benefit recipients
younger than 65 years old
aExcluding (early) retirement
Source: CPB
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wage in terms of the after-tax modal wage from about 80%
in 1981 to 67% in 1996 (see Figure 11). In addition, in-work
tax benefits were increased. Finally, youth minimum wages
were cut substantially.
The public spending to GDP ratio fell from 67% in 1983,
which exceeded the EU average at the time by more than
10 percentage points, to 54% in 1996, which is close to the
EU average.  Initially, the government used spending cuts
to reduce the fiscal deficit rather than the tax burden (see
Figure 9). Fixed targets for deficit reduction became the
main guiding post for fiscal policy in the eighties. The Dutch
experience thus shows that deficit reduction can be quite
consistent with employment growth.
    Only when the deficit was reduced substantially in the
beginning of the nineties, was the government in a position
to support wage moderation through substantial reduc-
tions in the tax burden. In recent years, the government has
reduced the tax wedge on minimum incomes substantially
(see Figure 12). This was done in order to stimulate employ-
ment of low-skilled workers.
Social insurance
It took a long time not only to get the public finances under
control but also to stop the vicious circle of rising inactivity.
The ratio of social security claimants to those employed
stayed roughly constant between 1983 and 1995, despite
rising employment. Only in recent years has it been pos-
sible to stabilize the number of social security recipients and
has the ratio of social security beneficiaries to employment
started to fall. Cutting benefits had not been successful in
reducing the number of recipients (see Figure 10), in part
because supplementary arrangements negotiated in collec-
tive labor agreements offset some of the cuts in unemploy-
ment, disability and sickness benefits.
In the nineties, eligibility criteria for social benefits were
tightened. In 1993, the legal definition of the appropriate job
was widened in the disability scheme. With residual earn-
ing power determining benefits, people who in the past
would have received full benefits now receive only partial
benefits. At the same time, the government reduced the
discretion of the executive organizations by issuing specific
criteria for determining disability and residual earning
power. For existing claimants, a program of reassessment
was started in 1994.
More recently, social security is being reformed more
fundamentally by the introduction of competition in disabil-
ity insurance and by the privatization of sickness insurance.
These reforms have two related primary aims. First, com-
petition ensures that contributions closely match actuarial
risks. Hence, employers are directly confronted with the
costs and benefits of their actions on these risks; they can
no longer shift the costs of their behavior onto a collective
pool. This encourages employers to reduce risks by improv-
ing working conditions and by cutting supplementary
benefits. Second, the introduction of competition is ex-
pected to reap efficiency gains in the implementation
and administration of the insurance. Private insurers and
public administrators face more incentives to revalidate
the sick and disabled. Organizations that are most success-
ful in preventing disability and encouraging revalidation
and reintegration can exploit this as a competitive
advantage.
Labor-market flexibility
Another major factor behind the growth of employment
(and the moderation of wages) is the growth of part-time
and flexible jobs. These types of jobs account for most
(three quarters) of the growth in employment since 1983
(see Figure 13). During the period 1983-1993, most of the
growth came from part-time work. More recently, flexible
contracts started to grow faster. At the moment, more than
40% of Dutch workers have either a flexible contract (12%)
or part-time contract (30%).
A flexible contract features a limited duration (a fixed
term) or a variable number of working hours. Especially
work through temporary work agencies rose substantially
in the last few years (to about 3.5% of working hours). Dutch
employers make more extensive use of temporary work
agencies than any other EU country. More generally, em-
ployers increasingly use flexible contracts to avoid employ-
ment protection, to screen new employees, and to meet
their need for flexibility. Regulations that restrict the use of
flexible contracts are quite liberal in the Netherlands.
Part-time work also enhances working time flexibility
with respect to regular fluctuations in work loads. More-
over, it meets the needs of parents with young children who
want to enter the labor market. Accordingly, by facilitating
the access of women to the labor market (and exploiting
their latent labor supply), part-time work has helped the
participation rates of especially younger and middle-aged
women to catch up to the European level. The job share of
part-time work of 30 percent is more than twice as high as
the EU average.
The match between the needs of employers and
employees in the case of part-time work illustrates the win-
win principle, namely that enhanced flexibility can benefit
not only the employer but also the employee; as tastes of
employees become more heterogeneous and variable,
* (tel. 31-70-3383400; e-mail: alb@cpb.nl)






















x 1000 contracts (full-time equivalents)
97/2
BPC_ R   E   P   O   R  T
21




Netherlands 58.8 47.1 46.7
Germany 53.7 45.7 48.7
European Union 54.6 51.0 49.2
United States 9.5 5.6 9.7
Sources: United States: OECD ‘Employment Outlook 1996’.
Other countries: European Commission ‘Employment in Europe 1996’.
market-oriented flexible working arrangements can tailor
to the individual needs of employees. In the same vein,
rather than relying on uniform reduction of the work week,
unions and employers have recently started to look for
solutions that allow individual employers and workers to
find tailor-made solutions. Also in the selection of the retire-
ment age, unions and employers are increasingly looking
for such tailor-made solutions that meet individual prefer-
ences on the basis of actuarially fair prices.
Flexible and part-time work contribute to a strong em-
ployment performance through other channels as well.
First, they keep more (especially young) people in touch
with the labor market, thereby protecting their human capi-
tal and working skills. This, together with the improved
access to the labor market, boosts effective labor supply
and provides better insurance against human-capital risk.
Second, a more flexible labor market is consistent with
the need to tailor to technological and organizational inno-
vations that demand more flexibility. For the same reason,
the Dutch government is currently deregulating markets for
goods and services. The policies of deregulating the mar-
kets for labor, goods, and services are mutually reinforcing.
The unfinished agenda
Now that we have examined the impressive side of the
Dutch model, it is time to turn the coin. The Dutch economy
still faces a lengthy unfinished agenda.
Access of vulnerable groups to work
Most of the employment growth in recent years benefited
those who did not draw on social benefits--such as the part-
ners of breadwinners and young people lacking sufficient
work history to be eligible for benefits. The recent reduction
in the ratio between benefit recipients and employment has
been attained mainly through an increase in employment
rather than a decline in the number of benefit recipients.
Benefit recipients still seem to have very limited access
to work. This is reflected in the high share of the long-term
unemployed in overall unemployment. While the unem-
ployment rates in the Netherlands and the United States are
rather similar at the moment, the incidence of long-term
unemployment is much higher in the Netherlands (see
Table 3). Indeed, in terms of long-term unemployment and
the low access of vulnerable workers without many mar-
ketable skills to work, the Dutch labor market is very much
European rather than American. Thus, also the Dutch have
not yet been able to reconcile high benefit levels for needy
groups with high levels of employment for these groups.
Reducing high inactivity (in persons)
The current unemployment figure of 7% substantially
underestimates the overall level of inactivity in the Nether-
lands. Broadly defined unemployment, including hidden
unemployment, may well exceed 20%. In particular, the
number of people collecting unemployment benefits is
about 75% higher than the number of unemployed who are
actively looking for work. A large portion of those collecting
benefits but not looking for work are older than 57 1/2 years
old, an age above which they no longer have to look for
work in order to be eligible for unemployment benefits. At
the same time, in addition to discouraged workers and in-
voluntary part-time workers, a substantial number of dis-
ability claimants are estimated to be hidden unemployed.
Indeed, the number of people collecting disability benefits
is still about two to three times the rate in neighboring coun-
tries. Disability, unemployment, and early retirement
schemes have reduced the participation rate of those aged
50-64 to low levels (see Table 4).
This low participation rate for elderly people is particu-
larly worrying in light of the ageing of the population. Inad-
equate labor supply may give rise to tensions on the labor
market. These tensions may reduce profitability and invest-
ment, thereby bringing employment growth to an abrupt
end and setting in motion the old vicious circle.
The low unemployment rate thus may be a sign of weak-
ness rather than strength because it indicates that not many
people on social security benefits are actively looking for
work. Indeed, the success of the Dutch economy should not
be judged on the basis of the unemployment rate but rather
on the way it utilizes the human capital of its population. On
this latter score, the Dutch still have a long way to go.
Utilizing human capital
Labor supply can be increased through four channels: First,
activating people drawing on social security; second,
increasing the effective retirement age; third, raising labor
productivity by more accumulation of human capital per
worker; and fourth, increasing the average working hours
per worker.
1. Activating benefit claimants
A first major challenge for the Dutch economy in the com-
ing decades will be to activate the latent labor supply locked
in social security schemes and to increase the access of
vulnerable groups to work. Technological and organizati-
onal developments increasingly put at risk vulnerable
individuals with few marketable skills.
To prevent long-run dependency and social exclusion,
the government should shift away from passive towards
22
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Table 4   Employment in persons in different age groups, 1995
age  Netherlands       EU-15      Germany   United Kingdom       France
in % of the population
25-49 75.9 74.3 77.7 77.8 77.8
50-64 42.0 46.6 50.0 57.0 43.3
25-64 66.6 65.4 67.9 71.6 67.9
Source: Eurostat, Labor Force Survey 1995.
active support that strengthens the earning capacity, skills,
adaptability, and employability of vulnerable individuals.
In this connection, conditional transfers based on the trans-
action principle (i.e. balancing the carrot of the benefit with
the stick of certain obligations) can be used to screen claim-
ants, thereby alleviating moral hazard. Moreover, in-kind
transfers can link support to activities (such as training,
unpaid trial employment, community work) that encourage
rather than discourage re-entry into employment. At the
moment, wage subsidies for hiring long-term unemployed
are already being used as a particular form of in-kind ben-
efits. In addition to stimulating and strengthening supply,
lower taxes on low-skilled labor can help to boost demand.
The same holds true for deregulation of sheltered sectors.
A shift toward more active policies involving condi-
tional and in-kind benefits calls for tailor-made solutions
implemented by a decentralized benefit administration
that exploits its information advantage about individual
circumstances.
2. Raising the effective retirement age
Another channel through which labor supply can be in-
creased is a higher average effective retirement age. This
age is currently below 60 years in the Netherlands. Also this
requires a mix of instruments at both the demand and sup-
ply sides. Moreover, lifelong learning should increase the
employability of older workers by increasing their capability
to learn and adapt. At the demand side, employers can be
encouraged to employ elderly workers not only by increas-
ing the skills of the elderly but also by reducing wage costs.
To achieve this, age-related pay schemes may have to be
reconsidered so that wages can be better adjusted to indivi-
dual productivity levels.
At the supply side, early retirement schemes should be
made actuarially fair to facilitate efficient retirement decisi-
ons. As people become more flexible, it is more important
that they are confronted with the right incentive structures.
Moreover, an early announcement of a higher statutory re-
tirement age can help to increase the effective retirement
age by lengthening the planning horizon of workers.
3. Investing in human capital
The increased knowledge intensity of production requires
more human capital accumulation. In addition, more hu-
man capital can alleviate the scarcity of labor as the popu-
lation ages. An increased capacity to learn also increases
the flexibility of people. Until now, a relatively small num-
ber of flexible workers bear the burden of the need to en-
hance the flexibility of the labor market. In the future, also
the core of the labor market (‘the insiders’) will need to
become more flexible, even if workers stay with the same
employer. This will help to reduce the dichotomy between
the two segments on the labor market. As noted above, life-
long learning can help to ensure that human capital lasts
longer, thereby raising the effective retirement age. Thus,
various arguments call for more investment not only in
vulnerable groups (see above) but in the population at
large. Creating the institutional arrangements that facilitate
the investment in people in an increasingly flexible labor
market is one of the greatest challenges facing the Dutch
economy in the coming years.
4. Raising the number of hours worked
The number of hours worked per Dutch person is low by
international standards (see Table 5). Hence, the participa-
tion rate in terms of hours is still low (see Figure 14). To
Table 5   Working hours, 1994
United States United Kingdom  W-Germany  Netherlands    Sweden
in hours per year
Per employee 1599 1531 1592 1329 1490
Per head 749 654 663 567 715
Source: DIW, CPB;  Pilat, 1996
.
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encourage labor supply and boost the tax base of the gov-
ernment, a further reduction in the overall tax burden would
be welcome. A lower aggregate tax burden would recon-
cile the need to, on the one hand, increase the access to
work of low-skilled labor by reducing tax rates on lower
incomes and, on the other hand, encourage workers to
increase their working hours by reducing marginal tax
rates. Indeed, as individuals become more flexible in selec-
ting their own working hours, high marginal tax rates be-
come more distortionary. In this connection, lower marginal
tax rates could help to facilitate a further expansion of fe-
male labor supply. There still is substantial room to raise
the female participation rate, especially in the number of
hours. Survey information does indeed indicate that many
women would like to work more hours. Also better child-
care facilities would facilitate this process.
Lessons from the Dutch model
Break the vicious circle
The Dutch experience reveals the importance of breaking
the vicious circle of more inactivity, higher spending on
social insurance, premium increases, higher labor costs,
and more employment reductions. If the vicious circle is
allowed to run along for an extended period, it leaves a hard
core of long-term unemployed and benefit recipients draw-
ing on open-ended social security benefits. Consequently,
stopping this vicious circle takes a long time.
Protect profitability
The share of profits in enterprise income is an important
guidepost in determining the appropriate levels of wages.
If profitability is low, wage moderation is an important
instrument in boosting employment.
Is wage moderation also an important instrument to
stimulate employment in the larger EU countries or will it
result in a recession? CPB’s world model (WEB) suggests
that wage moderation can be effective also  in a large coun-
try. Simulations with this model show that wage modera-
tion associated with a decline in the natural rate of unem-
ployment does not generate much foreign demand in a
large economy less dependent on foreign trade. However,
wage moderation is effective in boosting domestic demand
through the channels of lower interest rates, lower inflation,
higher profitability, and, eventually, more wage earners.
Indeed, whereas monetary policy in the Netherlands is tied
by the fixed exchange rate policy vis-à-vis the D-mark, wage
moderation in a large economy (or in Europe as a whole)
allows a more expansionary monetary policy to offset the
smaller contribution of foreign demand. Moreover, in a
large economy, there is less demand leakage to other
economies than there is in a small open economy. Hence,
a large economy has to absorb fewer losses in terms of
trade to stimulate demand.
Implement institutional reform
Wage moderation needs to be supported by institutional
reform aimed at reducing the natural rate of unemploy-
ment. This includes lower replacement rates, lower tax
rates, and more flexible labor and commodity markets. It
includes also tight eligibility criteria as well as a more
efficient administration of social security. Indeed, the
Dutch reform process increasingly involved fundamental
changes in incentive and institutional structures. The
emphasis gradually changed from macroeconomic policy
and ad-hoc measures towards fundamental changes
in (microeconomic) incentive structures. Now that inactivity
is concentrated among specific vulnerable groups,
these microeconomic policies are becoming increasingly
important.
Markets in social insurance
It is still too early to evaluate the recent market-oriented
reforms in disability and sickness insurance in the Nether-
lands. These reforms are likely to provide useful lessons for
other countries in reforming their social insurance systems.
The proposed Dutch system of disability and sickness in-
surance can be seen as a mix of coordination through con-
trol and competition. The statutory benefits are determined
by the political process. Moreover, several regulations pro-
tect the position of vulnerable groups. A pragmatic mix of
control and competition helps to exploit the strengths of
both coordination mechanisms. Also the pragmatic com-
bination of central broad guidelines and decentralized ex-
ecution in industrial relations has served the Netherlands
well.
A pragmatic mix
This pragmatic mix illustrates a broader principle. A pana-
cea for the unemployment problem is not available. Hence,
countries should rely on a broad range of measures.
Employing several instruments is attractive also for politi-
cal reasons: costs and benefits are spread over several
groups, thereby protecting social cohesion. Moreover, by
* (tel. 31-70-3383400; e-mail: alb@cpb.nl)
Figure  14  Participation rate in hours:
Actual hours worked/potential annual
hoursa worked
aPotential annual hours worked = labor supply in persons *48 weeks  *40
hours
Source: Maddison, 1991, 1995; Pilat, 1996; DIW, CPB
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using both carrots and sticks, governments prevent the
alienation of specific groups. To illustrate, to reduce the
claims of low-skilled workers on social security, the govern-
ment can combine the stick of lower unconditional benefits,
aimed at raising supply, with the carrot of tax cuts and de-
regulation of sheltered sectors, aimed at raising the de-
mand for low-skilled labor.
Taking action on several fronts also diversifies risks.
Indeed, the process of social innovation is a process of trial
and error in the face of current problems and newly emerg-
ing trends. Finally, policies are often complementary in the
sense that the effect of each policy is greater when it is
implemented together with other policies than when it is
introduced in isolation.
A flexible labor market
A flexible labor market can meet the needs of both employ-
ers and employees. Technological and organizational
developments and a more heterogeneous society demand
more flexibility and tailor-made solutions.
Fiscal policy in a medium-term framework
The present government has drawn two lessons from the
experience of fiscal policy in the late eighties and the early
nineties. First, fixed targets for cuts in the fiscal deficit, al-
though needed in the eighties to cut the excessive fiscal
deficit, make fiscal policy rather sensitive to the business
cycle. Second, a fiscal program based on a medium-term
forecast for the economy can seriously disrupt the budget-
ary process if growth turns out to be slower than antici-
pated. In order to avoid unrest in the budgetary process and
better control spending, the present government has set a
ceiling on public spending and estimated receipts on the
basis of a cautious economic scenario. In this way, the fis-
cal deficit is allowed to fluctuate with the business cycle up
to a certain ceiling. These innovations have contributed to
a more predictable, cyclically neutral, fiscal policy, thereby
contributing to confidence in the private sector.
Conclusions
Is there a Dutch miracle? As with a lot of miracles, the Dutch
miracle disappears to a large extent when it is scrutinized.
Still, the Dutch experience yields several lessons, not least
for the Netherlands itself. The switch from macroeconomic
to microeconomic policy is still in full swing.
Adapting institutions and incentive structures to newly
emerging trends has to be a continuous process. Not only
do exogenous trends demand adjustments, but also en-
dogenous unintended responses to policies usually be-
come apparent and fully understood only after some time.
Both the inadequate response of Dutch economic policy in
the seventies to the change of times and the fundamental
and persistent reform process that started in the early eight-
ies show the importance of anticipating trends and gaining
insight into how the economy functions. Economic ideas,
when communicated clearly, do matter. By anticipating
future trends, economic policymakers can reconcile stabili-
ty and social cohesion with timely adjustments to new cir-
cumstances. This is the continuous challenge for
policymakers all over the world.
Notes
1 This article is based on a contribution to the Economic Policy Roundtable
of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) in Amsterdam on May 12,
1997. The author would like to thank two referees and numerous colleagues
for comments on this paper. In particular, Hans Roodenburg, Marc Pomp, Adri
den Ouden, Rudy Douven, Maya Verhoeve, and Erwin Zijlerman contributed
in important ways to this article. Of course, the author remains responsible
for any errors.
2 The level of GDP per hour worked, however, is still very high compared to
other EU countries and matches that in the United States.
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